Department of Philosophy, Program in Neuroscience
Hartford, CT 06106
Dan.Lloyd (at) Trincoll.edu
(This page is under construction...)
Understanding consciousness is my core research interest. This implicates phenomenology – the philosophical effort to characterize the essential structures of experience – and cognitive neuroscience – the empirical quest to understand the function of the brain and nervous system. Phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience are very different in their methods, presuppositions, and principal findings, so the effort to establish a scientific neurophenomenology draws broadly from many disciplines, and inevitably takes some unconventional turns.
Some areas of ongoing work include:
Time and temporality: The subjective experience of duration and change is fundamental to human consciousness, but little is known about how the brain supports continuous time awareness.
Consciousness and narrative: Stories are distinctly temporal structures, and their universality among human cultures suggests a close link to basic brain function.
Consciousness and music: Music is another universal temporal structure, whose operations may offer clues to the neural foundations of experience.
Both narratology and musicology deploy formal tools and templates to their domains of study. Much of my recent work reapplies those templates to the data of neuroscience.
In addition to neurophenomenology, cognitive neuroscience itself is an area of research interest. My work includes critiques of some of the main methods in the field, especially with respect to the devastating illness of schizophrenia.
Functional MRI into musical sound
...and other brainmusic videos
Functional MRI and the study of human consciousness, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14: 818-831, 2002
· Terra Cognita: From functional neuroimaging to the map of the mind, Brain and Mind, 1: 1-24, 2000.
· Beyond ‘the Fringe’: A Cautionary Critique of William James, Consciousness and Cognition, 9: 629-637, 2000.
· Virtual lesions in the not-so-modular brain, Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 6:627-635, 2000.
· Consciousness, Connectionism, and Cognitive Neuroscience: A Meeting of the Minds, Philosophical Psychology, 9(1):61-81, March 1996
· Consciousness: A Connectionist Manifesto, Minds and Machines, 5(2):161-185, May 1995.
- Popping the Thought Balloon in The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, a comprehensive assessment, D. Ross, A Brook, D. Thompson, eds., MIT Press, 2000
- Consciousness and Its Discontents, Communication and Cognition, 30(3/4): 273-285, 1997.
- Twilight of the Zombies, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, March 1997.
Civil Schizophrenia, in Distributed Cognition and the Will, D. Ross and D. Spurett, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press), in press.
Through a glass darkly: Schizophrenia and Functional Brain Imaging, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, forthcoming.
Conscious and Unconscious
Connectionism and the Freudian unconscious
Teaching and Learning
Ocassional flights (fiction and essays)
Life in the fast lane of Liberal Arts
(update in progress, 7/30/09)