Religious Persecution as a U.S. Policy Issue
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III. Religious Persecution in the Middle East and Sudan

Abdullahi An-Na’im (Middle East): I would like to start with a personal note for all participants to understand where I’m coming from. I am an advocate of human rights, all human rights, from an Islamic point of view. To me, it is not a question of Western values and Eastern values. To the extent that we can achieve consensus on the definitions and the statement of what human rights are, these are universal rights due to every human being everywhere in the world. The issue is how to promote the necessary consensus. I will suggest in my remarks that this U.S. initiative is counter-productive for freedom of religion globally precisely because it undermines, rather than enhances, universal consensus on the meaning of religious freedom and how it can be protected around the world.

Because I am critical of this U.S. initiative, I also want to make it clear that I am grateful for the opportunity to speak freely in this country. The position I am presenting here has nothing to do with the Islamic fundamentalist views of the present government of Sudan to which I am totally opposed from an Islamic point of view. At this point, I am just acknowledging the fact that I am able to be so critical of this aspect of American foreign policy because this system and society grant me this privilege.

Now to my critical remarks: To begin with the title of the Act, "International" protection means multi-national action. You cannot do something alone and claim it to be international. You can say it’s a U.S. foreign policy objective, or a domestic American political issue, but don’t call it international, and invoke the name of the unity of human rights to make that claim.

Unless we go through the effort to define freedom of religion in a truly universal manner that includes other perspectives, we cannot be effective in promoting freedom of religion around the world. The difficulties of addressing freedom of religion in this manner include the question of how to isolate religion issues from other issues. Another difficulty relates to defining freedom of religion, even in the Christian and/or Islamic context, let alone profound differences between these "world religions" and traditional African or Native American religions where religious belief and practice are not seen as an independent aspect of the totality of the life of a community.

The irony is that if the U.S. joined other countries in efforts to protect and promote all human rights, instead of focusing so exclusively on this particular right while refusing to ratify other international human rights treaties, one need not attempt this impossible task of isolating freedom of religion from other aspects of the life of human societies around the world. It is curious that the U.S. is so protective of its own sovereignty that it refuses to ratify an almost universally ratified treaty like the Rights of the Child Convention, and yet it expects other countries to share its own particular concern with freedom of religion.

In page 9 of the preface to the State Department report, we have this unidentified voice which tries to explain the American approach to freedom of religion, and yet to insist that the U.S. is applying only international standards in its assessment of the performance of foreign governments. This is a contradiction, because the U.S. approach, as such, is not universal or international. Moreover, the U.S. has consistently refused to be part of the process of developing and implementing international rights, whether on freedom of religion or any other human right, and yet here comes this "Lone Ranger" effort on this particular freedom.

In addition, proselytization is not only about freedom of religion. It is about politics. It’s about power. It’s about history. It’s about identity. For many communities around the world, especially in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the issue is not simply a right of a single person to believe or not to believe as he or she might want to, it’s a question of what the implication of that belief will be for the community—past, present, and future. Proselytization has been the spearhead of colonization in Africa. Missionaries have had a very close alliance, at least in popular perception, with colonial expansion in various parts of Africa and elsewhere. So for people now to see freedom of religion as including the right to promulgate one’s religion in isolation of the power relations issue in the present age of globalization is wrong. It should be noted here that globalization is not a "neutral" medium of interaction between societies and countries. It tends to enhance and facilitate existing power relations between these social and political entities.

Also, "free exercise" of religion cannot mean the same thing for Islamic fundamentalist activists as it means for Americans. I am personally totally opposed to Islamic fundamentalists, as I believe that the idea of an Islamic state to enforce Shari’a is a conceptual impossibility, and a historic fallacy. The conceptual impossibility of this idea is that, as soon as Shari’a is enforced as positive law, it becomes the political will of the state, and not the divine will of God. The idea of an Islamic state is a historical fallacy because it never happened in 15 centuries of Muslim history. But regardless of my personal views, the majority of Muslims believe in an Islamic state. For Muslims, freedom to practice their faith includes the right to seize control of the state in order to "enforce the will of God." So unless one is able and willing to tell Muslims that, "You are going to practice religion as I say you should," how will it be possible to protect the freedom of religion of those Muslims without encouraging tremendous political instability in countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia which are strategic allies of the U.S.? If you "exempt" those countries from the proposed sanctions under IRFA, then the credibility of the whole initiative will be seriously compromised.

Finally, I was surprised earlier in this meeting that when panelists were asked about "the costs" of implementing this Act, they all focused on "budgetary" calculations—on how much money the U.S. Congress or government is willing to spend. In my view, the real cost of this initiative is the long term economic, political, security and other consequences of what the U.S. will do or fail to do in accordance with the "mandate" of this legislation: will it penalize China or Saudi Arabia for their clear violations? If yes, what will be the consequences for U.S. international trade and security interests? If no, what are the implications for the credibility of what the U.S. is prepared to do in any other part of the world?

Jemera Rone (Sudan): Some facts about Sudan. It’s 40/60 Arab/African. And 60/40 Muslim/Other. The "other" is sometimes referred to as Christianity and animism. Actually, it’s traditional religion, it’s not animism.

There is a war in Sudan. And 1.9 million people have been killed in this war that, so far, has lasted for 16 years. Part of the war is about economics, of course. Oil is in the south. And the waters of the Nile also. Those are two very important economic resources that the south has. It’s not entirely a regional war but it does have regional elements in it.

Slavery exists in Sudan. There isn’t much question about that. Even the government now acknowledges that it has a problem with what it calls "abduction and forced labor," which are two of the main characteristics of slavery as it exists in the Sudan. It is a resurgence of slavery—there was also slavery in the nineteenth century—brought about by the war. Slavery is a form of war booty. Additional booty is cattle—sometimes more valued by the raiders. And it is extremely brutal in the way it’s practiced.

I don’t think that this is a case of genocide in Sudan. Also I don’t think slavery is caused by, or is the result of, religious persecution. I would argue that the war is not really about religion, though with some refinements that I am getting to. Also, it’s not north/south, and it’s not Arab/African, strictly speaking, because there are people who identify themselves as Arabs on both sides, and there are people who are Christian on both sides. That is partly a result of the government’s attempt to divide the south.

Christianity has been particularly valuable for some people, such as southerners who are living in Khartoum, the capital, where they are treated as second or third class citizens. There is a lot of racial discrimination, a lot of notions that their culture has no value, that they’re pagans. They are considered a "blank slate," and therefore they are free to be proselytized by Muslims because they don’t have anything of any value in terms of their own culture or religion or language.

So there has been conversion in the north and in Khartoum by southerners who look to Christianity as a means to defend themselves against an onslaught, as they see it, by a religion and political movement that is trying to destroy their culture. And they have looked in many cases to another world religion as a defense because their unwritten culture and religion have not been a very good defense.

The NIF [National Islamic Front] came to power not through religion but through a military coup. And they have as opponents not only unions but also political parties that existed in Sudan which were—the two largest parties—based on Islamic sects. And they would always outvote the NIF in any election. So they could not hope to come to power through elections, certainly not in the 10 to 20 year range. But once in power they also wanted or needed to justify themselves because of the undemocratic way that they came to power. The ideology that they use to justify their continuing in power is that they are the bearers of the true Islam.

Now they will say that, unlike other countries in the Middle East, there is a great deal of tolerance in Sudan. But they harass the churches. They have an elaborate legal system to try to keep them penned in. And Christian churches will tell you that they feel they’re constantly threatened, they are suffocated, they are persecuted. They can’t breathe.

One of the most important developments in Sudan in the war in the south has come about from the new Sudan Council of Churches. This is based in Nairobi and represents the Protestant and Catholic churches that are in the liberated areas, as they say, of the south. They have sponsored a process of peace and reconciliation among southerners. That’s enormously important, because the way that the government has of waging the war is to divide and conquer and to keep southerners fighting with each other. This Council threatens to undo it and for that reason the government hates this reconciliation process. The concept has really taken off in the south because there is a very deep desire for peace among southerners. Although the new Sudan Council of Churches is sponsoring it, the process incorporates a lot of elements of traditional religion, such as covenants and pact making, and recognizes that people are very much still following these elements of traditional religion in the south.

Rosalind I. J. Hackett: I particularly want to highlight the issue of terminology and the power of language. Language is not insignificant. I think that the U.S. actions in creating the bill and writing the report are certainly sending out a message about the power to define and eventually act upon this problem. And it’s also sending out a message, as suggested, about what counts as religion and what doesn’t. Terms such as "faith" and "faith tradition" have become very popular yet are actually inapplicable and irrelevant. They are certainly not used by indigenous groups or, as far as I can tell, by new religious movements. I mean, these are terms that apply mainly to the world religions. We are not hearing enough about the collective or the communal definitions and understandings of religion.

I would also adhere to the distinction between religion and state rather than the terminology "church and state." I am not against the terminology of church and state where it is an issue of church and state, but I do object to the extension of its use when you are talking about it internationally. It is offensive to Muslims, for example. So again, this raises the whole issue of perception.

I have just a couple questions for Jemera. She hinted at this but I wanted to say more about this. The case of Sudan, as China, perhaps, has become utterly emblematic of what constitutes religious persecution. Particularly at the popular level, in my studies of web sites or e-mail communications or popular Christian literature, it is quite obvious that for many U.S. Christians, particularly evangelical Christians, Sudan is really the bad guy.

What has been the response of the Sudanese government to being held up in this negative limelight, and to the intensive activity at local levels in the U.S. and in other parts of the world in trying to protect Sudanese Christians? Second, I want to know, is this counterproductive, as Abdu suggests?

Jemera Rone: On the counterproductive issue, I think that there are a lot of things that the U.S. does and a lot of rhetoric from the U.S. as well that is counterproductive. And a number of people—southerners and some in the SPLA [Sudan Peoples Liberation Army]—have said that it hurts them more than it helps them when a congressional resolution comes out, for instance, with wording that there will be no-fly zones. The government of Sudan takes that to the Middle East and markets it all over the place for additional support against the "imperialist power" that is going to impose a no-fly zone. It doesn’t matter if it doesn’t make it into the final language of the resolution and that the resolution is not mandatory. They are not getting those distinctions, or they are ignoring them. So I think there is a certain element in the cause of religious persecution that not only puts the government off but also gives them a lot of ammunition to use in other parts of the world. Also, the effort for slave redemption is not without problems. And the problem that I hear southerners and even people in the SPLA—not just close to the SPLA but in the SPLA—say is that "it’s become a business." And you will hear this phrase a lot if you’re in that region. And others are afraid that it might lead to more raids. As part of a much-publicized episode of the TV program Touched by an Angel they were saying that for $50 you can buy freedom for a slave. But that isn’t actually right. The $50 does not all go to the slave; as with most organizations, there is a certain amount of overhead and travel and so on and so forth. A part of that also gets donated to local authorities. So it actually costs more than $50 to buy a slave. Now, the one group—Christian Solidarity International, which now I think has a monopoly on slave redemption in the south—experienced a split over a year ago worldwide and most of the national chapters broke away from the Swiss chapter which is still doing slave redemptions. And the American group, Christian Freedom International, was the subject of an article in the Atlantic Monthly that came out in May or June that recounted how they became disillusioned with the redemption practice and why they offered to return people’s donations made to redeem slaves. They called on people to stop this business because it was just making a bad situation worse. And they also thought it was becoming a business and that it was becoming an incentive for people to take more slaves so they could rake in the $50 a head. The other part of the business aspect is that unscrupulous people are taking advantage of well-meaning foreigners and fobbing off children who were never abducted and were not slaves and padding the account, so to speak.

Steve Moffitt: I have two questions. One, why do you not apply the genocide label to what’s going on in Sudan? And secondly, I think you also said that slavery is not a result of religious persecution. Why do you say that? Are there militias abducting Muslims as well?

Jemera Rone: They indiscriminately grab anybody in a particular area, regardless of their faith. The people who are raiding are marginalized people. They are co-opted by the government into being on their side rather than being in another political party that they used to be in by this system of war booty. The people who are doing it are not really motivated by religion and they don’t claim to be. As to genocide, the Genocide Convention is very narrowly written, in my opinion, and it requires intent. The intent that is required is to "destroy in whole or in part a people as such." So they have to be going after a people "as such." All of those acts go on in the war, but I don’t think the necessary element of intent is there because I don’t think that they’re trying to destroy the southerners or particularly the Dinka "as such." But I am not going to go and write a report about how it’s not genocide because that’s too useful to the Sudanese government.

Steve McFarland: You mentioned the motivation of the raiders, but do you view them as a function of the NIF? Do you believe the NIF has a goal of forced Islamization of the south and is therefore using various means to that end?

Jemera Rone: Yes, there are a lot of people that do want to convert everyone. But they don’t have the capacity and there are people also in the NIF who are not interested in converting southerners and would like to just get rid of the south because it’s too much of a problem. They’ll never win the war, so these are people that favor separation. But then you have the oil interests that tip things the other way. So they have a mixed bag on it.

Tom Farr: When slaves are taken and forcibly converted to another religion, this is strong evidence of religious persecution—without respect to other explanatory elements that one can cite, such as economic or other factors.

Joseph Assad: We shy away from using the word "genocide" even though all the conditions are met, according to the United Nations Genocide Convention. Two million people have been killed and the world looks away. Yes, I think we need to support initiatives such as the Sudan Council of Churches, but we need to acknowledge that there is genocide. Two million people have died and the world looks away. Why aren’t we using the "G word"? Why don’t we say it is genocide? In Rwanda our excuse was it happened too fast. In Sudan, it has been 16 years, so maybe it happened too slow. Are we waiting for the right conflict? Are we waiting for the right speed of mass killings to call it genocide?

Abdullahi An-Na’im: My point is not to drive away people from calling it genocide. Recalling that the Genocide Convention requires member states to act to prevent and punish genocide, the question I am raising is what will happen when we do call what is happening in Sudan genocide? What is the point of classifying a situation as genocide if we are not willing to pressure our own government—your own government in this case—to do what is right by this classification?

Cole Durham: What I want to know is, I hear the criticisms that Abdullahi is leveling at IRFA, but what would he recommend as an alternative? I think part of our obligation is not to be a Lone Ranger, and we have got to be better at that. But there is a certain reality if you’re the only super power. You are thrust in a Lone Ranger role whether you like it or not. Are there ways that we should be more effective in dealing with that reality? Moreover, we as Americans need to know a lot more about what colonial practice really was. Because in some senses we weren’t a classical colonial power, we were a colony. The charge of colonialism imputes to us a lot of things that were done by colonial powers. I find myself wondering, is the charge of neocolonialism in some way a kind of passive/aggressive attack? That is, it is a charge saying "don’t hassle us on this particular issue; wait until you have got a complete consensus in all the nations of the world and then, and only then, confront us on particular issues."

Abdullahi An-Na’im: Yes. I completely agree that action must be taken on this, and many other human rights violations. But the point I wish to emphasize is that such action should not undermine other efforts to protect and promote all human rights. The point is how to "invest" in the rule of law in international relations, and how to protect all human rights, rather than be opportunistic and selective. I am drawing attention to the far reaching negative consequences of the rest of the world watching the U.S. refusing to act on the existing global consensus, for example, over such matters as the rights of the child, while insisting to "invent" its own global consensus on religious freedom!

Tom Farr: You said that the United States is not willing to engage in a multilateral process. But in implementing the International Religious Freedom Act and issuing the Report, this is precisely what we are doing—engaging the international community, and drawing on international standards to which the nations of the world have committed themselves. We are invoking the concept of mutual accountability and saying, "this is a universal standard to which we should be held and to which the world should be held." This is the purpose that underlies the Report. It is not an act by a Lone Ranger; it is an act of participation in the international community, drawing on universal standards. These are standards that are bolstered by the religious conception of the universality of human dignity, which is certainly not part of any one tradition but is owned by mankind. Secondly, if I could address briefly the issue of religious persecution and how one defines it. This obviously is a terrifically important question for scholars, as well as for policy makers. If we may attribute religious persecution only to those tormentors who are motivated solely by animus on the basis of religion, then I think we have adopted too narrow a standard by which to assess religious persecution. In the Report, we tried to deal with this definitional problem in the context of Kosovo. On the one hand there are many people who find what Milosevic did in his campaign in Kosovo utterly unexplainable without reference to religion. Others would say, well, wait a minute, if you dissect it you see that the campaign was primarily ethnic. It was primarily a case of nationalist ethnic cleansing that, in fact, spared certain Muslims who were not Albanian—Turkish Muslims, for example. You can go back and forth on this. My only point is that at the end of the day somebody’s got to make a judgment. Somebody’s got to conclude the analysis and say, okay, the fact of religion is either significant enough to include this as religious persecution, or it falls below the threshold. It is a difficult but terribly important question.

Laura Bryant: I do think that the U.S. has a right to regulate its own policy, including in the matter of foreign assistance. There are times when the U.S. has to make a decision. On the issue of double standards, I am not asserting that U.S. foreign policy has always been consistent. We obviously have strategic interests, including military alliances, that we must factor in. But I think it’s confusing the issue somewhat to say, as Professor An-Na’im suggested, that if you don’t impose sanctions on Saudi Arabia and Israel, you couldn’t possibly impose sanctions on the Sudan. Violations may take place in other countries without reaching the massive, egregious level they do in the Sudan. So I think we have to be a little careful about talking about the types of violations that would constitute a double standard in terms of actions applied by the U.S. under IRFA.

Smita Narula: I don’t think anybody is saying that religious freedom is not something universal. I think both of us have said it is a universal value and founded on traditions that are non-Western as well as those that are Western. But creating a credible and solid platform from which to start to engage in these issues—and thereby increasing the effectiveness of the intervention—has to be the first step. The message has to come from a place which itself respects international standards. The U.S. record in international human rights law does not indicate that it has made the type of commitment that it is now asking from other countries.