Religious Persecution as a U.S. Policy Issue
    Introduction     Participants     Contents  

IV. Religious Persecution in Europe

Willy Fautré: The European continent is multicultural, multilingual and multireligious. However, in many cases, a specific religion has been closely linked to the creation of modern nation-states and pretends to enjoy or effectively enjoys some privileged status legally, politically, and socially. Consequently, most European countries have a two-tiered or multi-tiered system in which religions have different statuses and citizens are not treated in the same way.

The most obvious shift is undeniably between, on the one hand, religions which the state recognizes and therefore legitimizes with some sort of label, and on the other hand second-rank religions which are not recognized—"sects" or "cults." The criteria for establishing various categories of religions are often disputable and sometimes non-existent.

The categorization of religions leads to a categorization of state financing systems that are discriminatory. In the wide variety of financing systems in force in Western Europe, taxpayers may not be allowed to finance their own religion and may to various degrees have to finance religions and sometimes also secular humanist movements that they do not adhere to.

Mass homicides/suicides and crimes committed by a number of cults around the world in the 1990s have triggered an indiscriminate witch-hunt against hundreds of minority religions and against their adherents by anti-cult movements and the media all over Europe and by the parliaments of France, Belgium, Germany, and Austria.

In the two-tiered system currently in force in Belgium, for example, state recognition implies access to state financial support. This explains why most religions, whatever their historicity or their size, apply for state recognition. However, State subsidies are provided by all the taxpayers, including those who profess a non-recognized religion or who do not profess any religion.

Such a system is no longer adapted to the globalization process, to an ever-extending Europe with increasingly fading internal frontiers, or to modern societies that are becoming more and more heterogeneous. It needs to be replaced by a new deal with new rules, but it must be realistic.

Europe has a long history as a welfare state in most sectors of society, including the religious sphere. It is, therefore, more pragmatic to plead for a reform of the system in a way that could awaken synergies between various segments of civil society rather than for a radical change, such as putting an end to the state financing of religions. Such a change would trigger much opposition from the religious establishment and is unlikely to find any political support.

Norway, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Spain have introduced a system that partially allows taxpayers to allocate a part of their income taxes to the religion of their choice. However, there are big disparities between the systems of these countries.

Consider also how different international religious freedom reports handle the issue of two-tiered systems. There exist very few reports about world-wide religious freedom. Until recently the only one published on an annual basis was the report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance and Discrimination. However, his financial and human resources are very limited. With the passing of time, the number of pages has been drastically reduced on budgetary grounds. In the last issue that only comprises twenty-seven pages, every country is very briefly and quite unsatisfactorily covered.

Following on from the International Religious Freedom Act signed into law by President Clinton on October 27, 1998, the U.S. State Department published a first report in September, 1999. In covering 194 countries in about one thousand pages, the American report is the first large-scale attempt to X-ray religious freedom around the world on the basis of a number of criteria. It is a tool and a reference work. In the future, it will certainly be seen as a landmark in the history of advocacy of religious freedom because it is the first time that an international human rights report echoes the concerns and complaints voiced by minority religions.

What do the U.N. and State Department reports say about two-tiered systems and states that use them? The U.N. report is silent about France and Austria although they have created a category of second-rank religions called sects or cults and have decided to combat them. Germany’s profile is limited to a few lines on a controversial group, Scientology. The part devoted to Belgium comprises three paragraphs, the last of which is quite at odds with assessments made by academics, experts, and international organizations such as the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. The contribution about Greece just focuses on minor incidents which are not representative of the situation in the country.

In none of these country profiles is the two-tiered system highlighted as a structural source of institutionalized discrimination towards minority religions.

The U.S. State Department report, by contrast, deals with the discrimination and inequalities brought about by two-tiered systems. However, despite its qualities, the U.S. report is certainly perfectible. There are a number of factual mistakes, omissions, mischaracterizations, and over-emphases (especially regarding Scientology in Germany).

Such mistakes could have been avoided and could be noted in the next report if each embassy had had its report proofread by one or two local experts before sending it to Washington for a final review. In the future, the U.S. embassies should remain in contact with three categories of sources if they want to be seen as neutral and credibly reliable: first, lawyers, human rights organizations, and minority groups; second, governmental sources; and third, established religions and anti-sect movements, etc.

An assessment is a first step, but it is not sufficient. A policy aimed at improving religious freedom must also be implemented by the United States. Also, there is the question of whether it is up to the United States alone to draft a report on religious freedom around the world. No other country seems interested in replacing or collaborating with the United States in advocating religious freedom. But would it be unthinkable to have the assessment of religious freedom in almost all European states carried out under the auspices of the OSCE ? An annual evaluation of the religious freedom policies carried out by its member states with regard to their commitments to the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document would fit perfectly into the mandate of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and its committee of experts on freedom of religion and belief.

Stephen A. Kent: In recent years, various officials of the United States government have been critical of European approaches to organizations variously called sects, cults, minority or alternative religions, and new religious movements. Several European countries—Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland—have commissioned national studies of these groups. Scientology’s battles in France, Greece, and especially Germany, have gained considerable American press, and additional battles are brewing between the Jehovah’s Witnesses and several European states.

As an American who has lived and studied new religions for nearly two decades from my vantage point in Canada, I understand most of the Americans’ concerns about European religious human rights issues. At the same time, however, I am in contact with European officials in Germany and France about their views of religious sects. I will present information that attempts to explain the Europeans’ critical approaches to the new religions in ways that differ from what many other academics have conveyed to American policy-makers.

Non-traditional groups—groups that are out of the mainstream and that demonstrate various degrees of tension with society—have a long history in Europe. Various "established sects" from the United States—Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-Day Adventists, Christian Scientists, Mormons, Pentecostal organizations, and so on—have been recruiting in Europe long before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Consequently, they have well-developed infrastructures and histories in various countries.

Some European countries have constitutionally and legally unique obligations that their governments must fulfil when dealing with these groups. The German government, for example, must maintain a "militant" protection "of the free democratic basic order," which thereby obligates officials to monitor, and if necessary take action against, anti-democratic organizations operating in the country.

Also, while Europeans certainly are aware of the major sectarian tragedies that happen occasionally around the world (Jonestown, Aum Shinri Kyo, >Heaven’s Gate, etc.), Europe has a few tragedies and "close-calls" of its own. Twenty-one of the 80 or so Branch Davidians who died at Mt. Carmel in 1993 were British citizens, and most of the 74 murder/suicide victims of the Order of the Solar Temple (who died at various times from late 1994 to early 1997) were Swiss and French. Authorities believe that they narrowly averted disaster in 1998 when Spanish police arrested a sect leader, 26 adults, and five children on the island of Tenerife. Allegedly, its members believed that "the end of the world was destined to occur" at 8 pm on January 8, and that "their souls would be picked up by spacecraft and transported to another planet."

Several European countries are concerned about the excessive access that some controversial religions have to American policy-makers. Europeans believe that these controversial religions are providing American policy-makers with information that often is questionable in content and accuracy. They also believe that this questionable information overshadows the facts and interpretations that the Europeans themselves try to provide.

By far the most controversial religious human rights lobby that has impacted American foreign policy in Europe is comprised of Scientology’s Hollywood celebrities. Their access to political decision-makers has diminished the stature of American foreign relations officials in the eyes of their German counterparts, and also probably in the eyes of other informed Europeans. In 1996 and 1997, a Scientology affiliate in Los Angeles was paying $725,000 to a Washington-based firm to lobby Congress on Scientology’s behalf. Working with three particular Scientology celebrities—John Travolta, Isaac Hayes, and Chick Corea—this lobby firm helped to arrange a number of high-profile meetings on Capitol Hill.

Probably through the efforts of the high-paid Scientology lobbyist, Travolta, Hayes, and Corea made presentations before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Commission) in September, 1997. And earlier in 1997, Bill Clinton happened to meet Travolta at a conference in Philadelphia, and the President told Travolta that he wanted to help him with Scientology’s problems in Germany. He followed up on that promise by arranging for the White House political affairs director to set up a briefing with Travolta and other Scientologists with national security advisor, Sandy Berger.

Perhaps the most incendiary event involving celebrities was the "open letter" to Chancellor Helmut Kohl in January 1997 that equated the German government’s handling of Scientology with Nazis’ persecution of Jews prior to World War II. Many of the 34 Hollywood celebrities who signed it had close ties to prominent Scientologists Travolta and Tom Cruise, and German officials were infuriated with the letter. Indeed, to their credit, the State Department and the Secretary of State denounced the Nazi comparison. Seen in context, however, with the Scientology celebrity lobby, all of these incidents indicated to the Germans that American foreign policy toward their country about religious human rights was being unduly influenced by what many critics cleverly call "Scientologywood."

While the Scientology lobby has had a surprising impact inside the United States, intense lobbying on the part of various interested parties also occurs on international levels. The Council of Europe became so concerned about the availability of biased information from this lobbying that it recommended that the governments of member states "where necessary, were to set up or support independent national or regional information centers on groups of a religious, esoteric, or spiritual nature." To some American officials, it is unthinkable that governments would collect information on religion. From a European standpoint, however, these centers may be the best way to control the quality of information that government officials, law enforcement, and the general public receive.

The Council has learned from the American experience that privately run so-called "cult-information" organizations are extremely vulnerable both to infiltration by sect-planted spies and to destruction by the very groups that they attempt to monitor. Indeed, many of the controversial new religions are really multi-faceted transnationals that have ready access to enormous resources—far more than any "cult-information" or "cult-monitoring" private agency ever could muster. The American example of the Cult Awareness Network provides Europeans with a negative model—a worst case scenario—that occurred when a "cult-monitoring" agency lacked state protection. To simplify a complicated story, Scientology was involved in legal challenges and, finally, a court case, that bankrupted the Cult Awareness Network; Scientology even acquired its name, logo, phone number, and files in the course of bankruptcy proceedings. This kind of gross violation of privacy and confidentiality would not happen if the European nations have governmentally sponsored monitoring and information sharing agencies, as has been recommended by the French, the Germans, the Belgians, and the Council of Europe.

Beyond these issues, European officials are troubled by the lack of awareness that State Department officials have about crimes and religious human rights abuses that occur on American soil and that they (the European officials) are trying to protect their citizens against. The most dramatic case in point involves Scientology’s operation of forced labor and re-indoctrination programs in California, Florida, England, and Denmark. These abusive programs, named the Rehabilitation Project Force or, simply, RPF, involve forcible confinement, physical coercion, social and psychological degradations, obligatory confessions, and hard labor, which the Scientology organization imposes upon its most committed but deviating or poorly performing members.

Especially because of Germany’s mid-century history, it will never grant Scientology religious status as long as it operates forced labor, RPF programs anywhere in the world. When, however, members of a German parliamentary commission on sects brought up the RPF in a 1998 meeting with the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, this State Department official had no idea what the commission members were talking about.

Also remarkable to the Europeans is that American legislation specifically exempts children from necessary medical care on religious grounds. The 1996 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act specifically states, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as establishing a Federal requirement that a parent or legal guardian provide a child any medical service or treatment against the religious beliefs of the parent or legal guardian." By contrast, European nations have committed themselves to protecting children from medical neglect caused by parents, which partially explains the difficulties that some European Jehovah’s Witnesses are facing.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that many European officials feel that some American policymakers have been unable to hear the concerns that various European nations have about the link between human rights defense and human rights violations. Many religions, after all, have long traditions of intolerance themselves, and they allow restrictions upon their members that seem antithetical to the free operation of democratic, tolerant states. I fully expect that, at some time in the future, European religious human rights officials will wax biblical when responding to American colleagues: "Judge not, lest you be judged."

Cole Durham: Religious freedom developments in Europe are extraordinarily important at this particular juncture in history for several reasons. The most obvious of these is that the rights of almost one-fifth of the world’s population are at stake. The Council of Europe has 41 member states with over 800,000,000 people living within its boundaries. The streamlined jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg now extends directly to this immense number of people. The indirect influence of Europe is even greater. The Strasbourg Court has emerged as the preeminent human rights court in the world, and its decisions constitute persuasive authority virtually everywhere. More generally, because of the great historical significance of Europe in the development of democratic forms of government and the framing of human rights, European experience and patterns of dealing with religious-freedom issues exert powerful indirect effects because of its influence as a model elsewhere. In this regard, church-state structures in Western Europe especially have a particularly powerful legitimating impact. Anything that Western countries do in the area of freedom of religion or belief is presumed to be legitimate as one moves further east.

It should also be noted that tensions between the United States and other Western nations on the nature of religious-freedom norms can be particularly unsettling. In a day when there are already influential voices challenging the universality of the rights identified in such key instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, small disagreements between the United States and Europeans as to minimum standards can be magnified into claims that the entire regime of international human rights law is groundless, merely relative, and illegitimate. It is accordingly important to structure dialogue on these issues so that candid and constructive criticism can occur while at the same time assuring that disagreements on issues of implementation of religious freedom norms are not blown out of proportion.

Passage of the International Religious Freedom Act has created some frictions with Europeans. The Act is perceived in some quarters as an example of the United States assuming a "Lone Ranger" role, and manifesting an excess of zeal. Yet in fact the Act is only committed to strengthening the implementation of the international religious freedom norms that Europeans have accepted. If IRFA is to avoid becoming an irritant that could divide a common western approach to matters of freedom of religion or belief, it is vital that ways be found to use it as an impetus for shared constructive efforts, and not merely as an occasion for self-righteous finger-pointing.

As an American, let me emphasize in this context that international minimum standards do not and need not mirror the United States’ model of state-religion relationships. Neither the key UN documents nor the European Convention have clauses that ban the "establishment of religion." Differing European countries take very different attitudes on the extent to which religion and state should be "separated." The resulting institutional structures are deeply entrenched and at least in their main features are unlikely to be held to violate European human rights standards. A declaration attached to the final act of the Treaty of Amsterdam underscores the fact that church-state matters remain subjects of national law, and the European Court’s doctrine of a "margin of appreciation" is likely to further reinforce subsidiarity in this area.

I agree with Willy Fautré that the multi-tier European church-state arrangements that put different religions in different categories almost invariably generate equality problems. But in light of a variety of practical and historical considerations, a broad range of such institutions is unlikely to be challenged under national constitutions and the European Convention, and any challenges filed would be unlikely to prevail. Thus, while more blatant examples of unequal treatment may be subject to challenge under human rights norms, for the most part existing church-state systems will survive. Given this reality, the fundamental issue is to find ways to assure that protection of traditional religious structures is not allowed to restrict the rights of smaller religious groups to the full range of freedom assured by the international instruments—namely, the "freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching." Whatever arrangements are preserved by two-tier systems with respect to dominant or traditional religions, protections at the level of the lower tier must be sufficiently robust to assure that smaller groups can practice the full range of their religious beliefs and are free from discriminatory burdens vis-ŕ-vis other citizens in exercising these rights. Limitations or burdens on these rights can be allowed only when they are strictly necessary and warranted by compelling or pressing social needs.

One of the difficulties in this area is that those developing church-state structures in Eastern Europe sometimes seek to replicate the privileges Western European systems accord to upper-tier religions without simultaneously adopting the sophisticated protections built into the Western systems for "lower tier" religious groups. For example, Germany’s "church tax"—which is available to upper tier "public corporations"—is cited in other countries to justify subsidization of churches from general tax revenues. What this overlooks is that, in fact, strong protections are in place in Germany to assure that the tax system is not used to coerce individuals to support a religion or belief other than their own. Thus, under the German system, church taxes withheld from a particular individual are paid only to the church to which that individual belongs, and individuals have the constitutionally protected right to leave their confession if they object to supporting it through the church tax. Moreover, to the extent that some countries do permit outright subsidies from general tax revenues, they are often justified on secular grounds. For example, even separationist France allows public funds to be used to support the operation and maintenance of church buildings, but this is justified in light of the secular interest in preserving structures of historical and cultural significance.

Even more problematic is the tendency for East European regimes to cite West European two-tier schemes in support of restrictive religious association laws. That is, restrictions on "lower tier" organizations are justified by loose references to the fact that similar restrictions are observable in Western Europe, without mentioning that the Western restrictions apply only to obtaining "upper tier" entitlements. For example, proponents of the 1997 Russian law that prevents groups from obtaining "organization" status if they have not been in Russia for fifteen years (or are not tied to a centralized organization) contended that they were merely following European patterns, even though no European country imposes anything beyond short "processing time" limitations for access to base-level entity status.

What this suggests is that while the rich array of alternative church-state systems in Europe is likely to remain, religious freedom concerns require that certain minimum standards should be met. One of the better summaries of these minimum standards is provided by the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document in the Helsinki process. Briefly, it provides that participating states in the OSCE are committed to taking steps to eliminate discrimination against individuals or communities on the grounds of religion or belief; to fostering a climate of mutual tolerance and respect; to providing legal entities through which belief communities can carry out the full range of their beliefs; to respecting the right of belief communities to autonomy in their own affairs; to respecting rights of religious education and training in the home, in schools, in theological institutions, and through international contacts; to allowing believers to acquire books, publications, and other articles and materials related to the practice of religion or belief; and to permitting groups to disseminate their views within their community and to others.

This is an important summary of key minimum standards, although it is not a totally comprehensive list. Among the issues that might be added are some that touch on finance issues. Where a state elects to subsidize religious activity, care should be taken to do so in ways that do not coerce individuals to support religious beliefs other than their own or that there is a secular justification for the expenditure. While economies of scale and reasonable constraints on use of public funds may set limits, state financial resources should not be distributed in discriminatory ways. The aim should be to provide equal access to public benefits to the greatest extent possible. Tax exemption schemes, for example, should not be structured in discriminatory ways. Limitations on freedom of religion or belief should be permitted only if they are prescribed by law, if they further one or more of the permissible state objectives listed in the limitation clauses of the international instruments, and if they are strictly necessary (in a democratic society).

It is with these principles in mind that the issues related to "sects" and "cults" raised by Professor Kent’s presentation should be addressed. At the outset of his presentation, Professor Kent indicated that he would attempt to "explain the Europeans’ critical approaches to the new religions" in ways that might help American policy makers better understand the European position. I applaud this effort, because I think there is much misunderstanding on both sides of the Atlantic that has been pushing Europeans and Americans apart, instead of pulling them together in pursuit of a common concern to protect freedom of religion or belief. Unfortunately, while I think the paper does help explain European perceptions, it does more to highlight the problem than to help draw the two sides of the Atlantic toward a common solution.

Professor Kent’s basic point seems to be that Europeans are concerned that American policy makers fail to appreciate the gravity of the threat that new religious movements pose. In this connection he cites the litany of highly publicized tragedies that have occurred—Jonestown, Aum Shinri Kyo, >Heaven’s Gate, Solar Temple, etc.—and supplements this with reports of forced labor >and re-indoctrination programs allegedly carried out by Scientologists. But objections to such wrongdoing, at least to the extent it can be objectively documented, are not a matter of dispute. American policy makers are just as convinced that criminal conduct should be punished as Europeans. The difficulty comes in providing the documentation. One would be interested, for example, in hearing Scientology’s explanations of its "forced labor and re-indoctrination programs," and would want to verify whether they are in fact qualitatively different from efforts to prescribe penance or to provide additional teaching to promote retention in other belief traditions. Those who run forced labor camps should obviously be prosecuted, but only by a prosecutor who can tell (and document) the difference between a forced labor camp and a monastery.

Professor Kent next points out that Europeans are worried about the "excessive access >that some controversial religions have to American policy-makers." Here the evidence is essentially what Professor Kent refers to as "Scientologywood"—i.e., lobbying by glitzy Hollywood stars who have ties to or are members of an unpopular religious movement. The European worry appears to be that American policy makers are duped by glamour. In fact, this European worry confuses a difference in political style with substance. The fact that American politicians may be more inclined than their European counterparts to play to the cameras that track movie stars does not imply that their decisions will not ultimately turn on sound considerations about the substance of religious freedom.

Professor Kent contends that the "Scientologywood" charge is compounded in the European mind by the fact that American policy makers seem to be "unaware" of serious problems such as forced labor programs allegedly carried out by Scientology, or other wrongful activities. The difficulty here, however, may not be American naiveté so much as excessive susceptibility of Europeans to stereotypical thinking about smaller religious groups. For example, when a U.S. State Department delegation last year went to Germany, Austria, Belgium, and France to discuss sect problems with appropriate officials in those countries, the U.S. delegates repeatedly asked for more information documenting genuine problems, but were not given credible substantiating evidence. This basic phenomenon was seen on a larger scale with the German Enquete Commission: After extensive information gathering by members of Parliament who for the most part seemed highly disposed to believe the worst about "sects," the conclusion was that no genuine dangers had been found and only the Scientologists required continued observation. Even that recommendation has met differing responses in different parts of Germany, and particularly since the Social Democrats assumed power.

Professor Kent also notes that Europeans seem troubled by American willingness to exempt parents who conscientiously oppose certain types of medical care from criminal liability under neglect statutes. This may indeed be a reason why Jehovah’s Witness parents may be having difficulties in Europe, but it is in fact a disputed issue both as a matter of religious freedom law and criminal policy how much it helps children for the state to exacerbate a parental crisis of conscience by adding penal liability into the equation. While the balance of opinion may be different on the two continents, the issue is clearly a disputed one in both places, and the exact contours of a solution will continue to be worked out on a case-by-case basis that no legislation can address in adequate detail.

The final European perception adduced by Professor Kent has to do with the proliferation of official, state-operated "sect observatories" or "information centers"—a proliferation that has now been endorsed by the Council of Europe. He maintains that the need for such public centers has been accentuated for Europeans by the "negative model" provided by the demise of the Cult Awareness Network ("CAN"). This is cited as a "worst case scenario" in which a private monitoring agency was purportedly bankrupted by Scientology litigation. As Professor Kent acknowledges, his account simplifies a story that was more complex. But whatever one thinks of the merits of the CAN litigation or its aftermath, the fundamental question posed by the formation of "sect observatories" is the appropriate role government should play in the formation of opinions about religion. If one could be assured that government institutions would play a truly neutral role and would provide absolutely objective and unbiased information, one could feel much more comfortable about creating such institutions. In the highly polarized atmosphere that often surrounds new religious movements, however, such neutrality and objectivity is particularly unlikely.

If the experience with the observatories formed to date is any indication, there are grave risks that such institutions will be captured by anti-cult personnel, often aligned with dominant belief communities in a country. All too often the supposedly "objective" information highlights the dangers of religious cults, and very little is done to avoid reinforcing over-broad stereotypes that all or a large number of smaller religious groups typically exhibit the dangerous features. Even if those running an observatory or information center are fair minded, there remains a risk that they will provide information based on media coverage or one-sided sources. The mere fact that such information emanates from a state body is likely to give it greater credibility than it deserves.

In the long run, what is important is to move beyond highly polarized charges of "naiveté" or "stereotypical thinking" and to reach a calmer, more balanced perspective on the underlying phenomena. What Europeans often forget about Americans is that we have had extensive experience with new religious movements. There was a wave of deep concern about these issues in the 1970s and 1980s, taking virtually exactly the same forms of concern currently evident in Europe. For the most part, this wave of concern has subsided. There were pressures at the time to compromise religious freedom principles to address the "dangers." But in the end, calmer minds prevailed. The dangers proved to be exaggerated; it turned out that serious problems could be dealt with adequately by existing criminal and civil laws; and the ideals of religious freedom vindicated themselves yet again.

It is difficult at present to assess what will ultimately happen in Europe. Possibly, Europe is experiencing a wave phenomenon like that experienced in the United States earlier, and one can anticipate that exaggerated concerns will subside in the not-so-distant future. The relatively calm outcome of the German Enquete Commission, which ultimately concluded that most groups posed no serious dangers, and parallel findings in the subsequent Swedish report, suggest that things may be moving in this direction. On the other hand, there are some reasons to think that the wave is less likely to subside in the European setting. In the United States, because of sharp separation-of-powers principles, there were never any state offices or institutions with special responsibility for working with and monitoring religious groups. The risk of capture by "anti-cult" groups was eliminated for the obvious reason that there were no institutions to capture. In Europe, in contrast, there is a risk that information centers could provide a base or point of public access through which anti-cult groups continue to spread disparaging and inflammatory information about unpopular groups. Even assuming that "information centers" will function fairly, as no doubt most Europeans would anticipate, there are still worries. Particularly as one moves further east, patterns of intolerant stereotypical thinking may be reinforced in some quarters by tendencies to scapegoat unpopular and powerless groups, possibly in the process of trying to solidify new national identities. Greater skepticism within the European populace about organized religion may also lend support to negative reactions to new religious movements. Such factors could continue to sustain heightened anti-cult consciousness.

My own hope is that the current wave of overreaction to new religious movements in Europe will be short-lived. The International Religious Freedom Act can play a significant role in helping bring about that result. If its mechanisms are exercised with sensitivity, it will help stimulate meaningful dialogue on religious freedom issues. Europeans and Americans will differ on these issues in detail, but I am convinced that Europeans are just as committed to freedom of religion or belief as Americans, and in the end, the right to that freedom will be vindicated.